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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent, :
v.

:

JAMES LEWIS GREEN, AKA
JAMES ALVIN DOUGLAS,

:

Case No. 890222-CA

Category No. 2

:

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of manufacturing a
controlled substance, a felony of the second degree in violation
of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), and possession
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)
(Supp. 1988), following a jury trial in the First District Court,
in and for Box Elder County, State of Utah, Judge Gordon J. Low
presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1987) and S 77-35-26(b)(1) (Supp.
1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the search warrant upon which the search of

defendant's garage/laboratory was premised was based upon
information that established probable cause.
2.

Whether the informant was acting as an agent for

the police, which triggers sanctions under the fourth amendment

to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 14 of
the Utah Constitution requiring exclusion of evidence seized
because of his misconduct*
3.

Whether the State's failure to preserve all

chemicals seized denied defendant due process and a fair trial.
4.

Whether the provisions in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-

2(4) (Supp. 1988) and S 58-37-3 (1986) that establish that a
controlled substance includes substances listed on the schedules
of the Federal Controlled Substances Act, as revised by Congress
or administrative rule of the United States Attorney General, is
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and
deprived defendant due process.
5.

Whether the jury instructions properly defined the

State's burden of proof, and whether the court erred in refusing
defendant's proposed instruction No. 1.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 53-37-8(1)(a)(i) and (iv) (Supp.
1988)t
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter,
it is unlawful for any person to knowingly
and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense,
or to possess with intent to produce,
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or
counterfeit substance;
•

• .

(iv) possess a controlled or
counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988)I
(4) "Controlled substance" means a drug,
substance, or immediate precursor included in
schedules I, II, III, IV, of V of Section 58-

37-4, and also includes a drug, substance, or
immediate precursor included in schedules I,
II, III, IV or V of the Federal Controlled
Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513, as
those schedules may be revised to add,
delete, or transfer substances from one
schedule to another, whether by Congressional
enactment or by administrative rule of the
United States Attorney General adopted under
Section 201 of that act. Controlled
substance does not include distilled spirits,
wine, or malt beverages, as those terms of
defined or used in Title 32A, regarding
tobacco or food.
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-3 (1986)s
(1) All controlled substances listed in S
58-37-4 are hereby controlled.
(2) All controlled substances listed in
the Federal Controlled Substances Act (Title
II, P.L. 91-513), as it amended from time to
time, are hereby controlled.
(3) Whenever any substance is designated,
rescheduled or deleted as a controlled
substance in schedules I, II, III, IV or V of
the Federal Controlled Substances Act (Title
II, P.L. 91-513), as such schedules may be
revised by Congressional enactment or by
administrative rule of the United States
Attorney General adopted pursuant to S 201 of
that act, that subsequent designation,
rescheduling or deletion shall govern.
Additional constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are quoted in the text of the brief as they become
relevant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Michael Lewis Green, aka James Alvin
Douglas, was convicted of manufacturing a controlled substance
and possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute (phenyl-2-propanone) following a jury trial on
February 27, 1989, to March 2, 1989, in First District Court in

and for Box Elder County, State of Utah, the Honorable Gordon J.
Low, judge, presiding.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
About the end of January, 1987, Andre Pommier began
doing various carpentry remodeling jobs for the defendant at
defendant's residence

(Pre-trial Motions Transcript, January 18,

1989, hereinafter "P.T." 90; Trial Transcript, hereinafter "T"
343).

During the course of his employment Mr. Pommier noticed

water running out of the garage (P.T. 92; T. 346), and at various
times noticed a funny smell around the garage (P.T. 93; T. 346).
Defendant told Mr. Pommier that there was furniture stored in the
garage (P.T. 93; T. 345). Mr. Pommier became curious and looked
inside the window of the garage; he did not see any furniture but
noticed a glass container with a glass tube with a coil inside
coming out of it with tubes attached (P.T. 93).
During the summer of 1987, Mr. Pommier was doing
demolition work on an atrium that was connected to defendant's
garage when he found a key to the garage (P.T. 91; T. 346). Mr.
Pommier used the key without defendant's knowledge, went inside
the garage, and found lab equipment, tables, and various chemicals
(P.T. 346; T. 92). Mr. Pommier was curious about the activities
going on inside the garage and had a duplicate key made (P.T. 92).
He entered the garage two or three times and looked into the
garage on at least six occasions (T. 347-8).

The lab equipment

was always in the garage when he looked or went in (P.T. 95; T.
348).

Mr. Pommier quit working for defendant in April of 1988 (T.

347).

The last time he went in the garage was shortly before he

quit working.

Mr. Pommier felt that something illegal was going on in
the garage (T. 349). On June 27, 1988, Mr. Pommier told sheriff's
deputy Lynn Yeates what he had observed in defendant's garage and
asked him what he should do with the knowledge (T. 349). Deputy
Yeates urged Mr. Pommier come into talk with police officers on
June 29, 1988. Mr. Pommier described to Deputy Mike Johnson
various equipment, glassware and chemicals he had observed on the
premises (R. 185-186).

This information was described to Art

Terkelson at the Weber State Crime Lab, who told the officers that
the equipment, glassware and chemicals were all consistent with
the production of phenyl-2-propanone and methamphetamine, both
controlled substances (R. 188; T. 300). As a result of the
information relayed by Mr. Pommier, the sheriff's office began an
investigation of defendant and set up surveillance of defendant
and his residence (T. 51). They followed defendant from his home
on several occasions.

Officers testified that each time defendant

drove in an erratic fashion which made it hard for the officers to
follow him (T. 54).
A search warrant was executed on September 15, 1988,
which included police officers from Cache County, Logan City, Box
Elder, Tremonton, Drug Enforcement Administration, and State
Narcotics (T. 55). Defendant was placed under arrest and advised
of his rights (T. 302-303).

Defendant indicated that he

understood his rights and agreed to speak with the officers (T.
303, 312). Kim Hall, an agent with the Utah Division of
Investigations, Narcotics Section, interviewed defendant.
Defendant stated "I know that you've got meM (T. 322). When

defendant was asked where the chemicals were going he replied
"that it wasn't in this state, and that he felt his life would be
in danger" if he were to tell the authorities (T. 314). Defendant
stated that the Hell's Angels were somehow involved in the
delivery of the chemicals.

He stated to the officers that "you

can go to jail and you can come back.

You go to dead, you don't

come back.H (T. 314).
Chuck Hall, a chemist for the Drug Enforcement
Administration, testified that in his opinion the laboratory in
defendant's garage was involved at the time of the search in the
production of phenyl-2-propanone (T. 106-07),

Under Mr. Hall's

direction samples were taken of thirteen chemicals.

These

chemicals were tested by Art Terkelson at the Weber State Crime
Lab.

The samples were found to contain, among other things,

phenyl-2-propanone (T. 232-235) which is a precursor to the
production of methamphetamine, and phenylacetic acid which is a
precursor to the production of phenyl-2-propanone (113, 118).
Officers found 15-50 gallon drums of phenylacetic acid on
defendant's premises.

They also found chemical formulas for the

production of phenyl-2-propanone using phenylacetic acid (T. Ill),
and formulas for the production of phenylacetic acid (T. 112).
Officers inventoried approximately 80-100 chemicals and
various pieces of lab equipment which were seized from defendant's
premises (P.T. 15-16).

After sampling what Mr. Hall felt were key

chemicals and inventorying all the chemicals and equipment seized,
Mr. Hall recommended that the remainder of the chemicals be
destroyed because of fire hazard, explosion hazard, poison hazard,

pollution hazard and Environmental Protection Agency law (T. 124126).

The remaining chemicals were destroyed.
Defendant testified at trial.

He claimed that he fired

Mr. Pommier because he had stolen things from defendant's home (T.
480).

He contradicted the testimony of the police officers

pertaining to the interview at his home at the time of his arrest,
and denied making the statement that Myou got me" (T. 492). He
also denied telling the officers that he would be shipping the
chemicals out of the state (T. 490,496).

He denied that he was

manufacturing phenyl-2-propanone (T. 493). He denied the presence
of the 750 pounds of phenylacetic acid (T. 505).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The search of defendant's home and garage was premised
upon a valid search warrant which was supported by probable
cause.
The informant was neither an employee nor agent of the
government.

He was acting solely as a private person when he

entered defendant's premises and discovered his illegal
activities.

Consequently, any wrongdoing on his part does not

trigger the exclusionary rule.
While agents seized about one hundred kinds of
chemicals from defendant's home and preserved only about a dozen
chemicals, which were later analyzed, the destruction of the
chemicals did not deny defendant due process or a fair trial.
The police inventoried the chemicals seized and defendant was not
precluded from presenting evidence that he possessed other
chemicals that were not associated with the production of phenyl-

2-propanone.

The evidence destroyed was not constitutionally

material to his defense.
The Utah legislature did not unconstitutionally
delegate its powers by including in the definition of a
controlled substances, those substances which are defined as
controlled by federal law.
The jury was properly instructed on the burden of
proof.

Defendant's requested instruction No. 1 was not an

accurate statement of the law and was not supported by the
evidence.

The trial court, therefore, did not err in refusing to

give the instruction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED SUFFICIENT PROBABLE
CAUSE TO SUPPORT ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT
Defendant argues that evidence seized during a search
of his home should have been suppressed based on his claim that
the search warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause
sufficient to support issuance of the search warrant.

He alleges

the affidavit supporting the search warrant is defective for
several reasons:

(1) the allegations set forth in the affidavit

did not establish probable cause as the affidavit did not reveal
the basis of the confidential informant's knowledge, nor did it
establish the informant's veracity; (2) there were misstatements
in the affidavit which should be excised; (3) there were material
omissions; and (4) the information relied on in the affidavit was
stale.

In State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987)
(footnote omitted), the Utah Supreme Court defined the standard
by which search warrant affidavits are to be judged:
Search warrant affidavits are to be
construed in a common-sense, reasonable
manner. State v. Williamson, 674 P.2d 132,
133 (Utah 1983); State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d
441 (Utah 1978). Excessive technical
dissection of an informant's tip or of the
nontechnical language in the officer's
affidavit is ill-suited to this task.
[Illinois v. Gates] 462 U.S. at 231-32, 23536, 103 S.Ct. at 2328-30, 2330-31. In Gates,
the Supreme Court emphasized that an
informant's "reliability" and "basis of
knowledge" are but two relevant
considerations, among others, in determining
the existence of probable cause under "a
totality-of-the-circumstances." 462 U.S. at
233-34, 103 S.Ct. at 2329-30. They are not
strict, independent requirements to be
"rigidly exacted" in every case. A weakness
in one or the other is not fatal to the
warrant so long as in the totality there is
substantial basis to find probable cause.
Id. 230, 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2328, 2332. The
indicia of veracity, reliability, and basis
of knowledge are nonexclusive elements to be
evaluated in reaching the practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the
circumstances, there is a fair probability
that the contraband will be found in the
place described.
The search warrant affidavit in the instant case easily
meets the Hansen standard.

Defendant correctly points out that

the United States Supreme Court, as well as the Utah Supreme
Court, have rejected as hypertechnical the Aguilar-Spinelli test.
Despite defendant's statement to the contrary, he would have this

Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v, United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The Aguilar-Spinelli test required
separate showing of the underlying circumstances of the
informant's tip to reveal the basis of his knowledge, and to
establish the veracity or the reliability of the informant.

Court continue to apply the Aguilar-Spinelll litmus test in
judging the instant affidavit.

His reliance on State v. Bailey,

675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984), to support use of this rigid test is
misplaced.

In Bailey, the Court stated that in some situations

the Aquilar-Spinelli guidelines might be necessary to establish
sufficient probable cause.

However, the Court went on to state

that M[i]n other cases, . . . a less strong showing of the basis
of the affiant's knowledge, veracity and reliability may be
required, if the circumstances as a whole indicate that the
informant's report is truthful."

Icl. at 1205-6.

Some of the

factors the Court considered relevant in this inquiry are:

the

detail with which the informant described his personal observation
of the contraband; the informant, an apparently disinterested
person, volunteered the information; and the informant stood to
gain nothing from providing the information.

The Court stated

that Minformation from citizen informants who stand to gain
nothing from providing information to the police is not viewed
with the same rigid scrutiny as is the testimony of a regular
police informant."

Icl. at 1206.

In the instant case, the informant was a disinterested
citizen who volunteered the information and stood to gain nothing
from providing the information.

He described in detail the

contents of the garage/laboratory.

It is clear that the correct

standard to be applied in this case is that espoused by the
Supreme Court in Hansen.

Looking at the totality of the

circumstances, there is a substantial basis to find probable cause
to support issuance of the warrant for the search of defendant's

home.

The informant, Andy Pommier, worked for the defendant (T.

343).

He personally observed on the premises large amounts of

chemicals, lab equipment and glassware (P.T. 346; T. 92; R. 18586).

He described these in detail to the police (R. 185-86).

The

police knew the informant to be a member of the community in good
standing, that he was reliable, and that he volunteered the
information with no claim for reward or legal favor (P.T. 55).
Detectives described the lab equipment and chemicals to a
criminalist, Art Turkelson, at the Weber State Crime Lab who
stated that they were consistent with the type of equipment and
chemicals used in the production of methamphetamine or phenyl-2propanone, both controlled substances (R. 188). Under these
circumstances the judge was justified in finding that there was
probable cause sufficient for issuance of the search warrant.
Defendant also attacks the statement in the affidavit
that the substances and equipment observed at his residence were
consistent with the production of the controlled substances.
Defendant's contention on this point is not clear, but seems to be
that the affidavit should have indicated that the chemicals and
equipment observed at defendant's residence were inconsistent with
some legal use.

Furthermore he avers that the criminalist could

not have concluded that possession of the chemicals listed was
illegal since possession of the individual chemicals was not in
itself illegal.

If this Court were to accept this position, it

would effectively preclude the issuance of search warrants for
clandestine-type labs, since a person would not only have to
observe the chemicals and equipment, but observe the entire

process.

Defendant makes the specious claim that possession of

legal chemicals which could be combined to make illegal substances
would somehow make all chemical companies subject to search at any
time.

This argument, along with the others espoused by defendant,

seems to be precisely the type of hypertechnical dissection of
search warrant affidavits that the Supreme Court is trying to
avoid.
Defendant next claims that there were two misstatements
in the affidavit which must be excised.

In State v. Nielsen, 727

P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme court, relying on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154 (1978), held:
a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing to challenge the validity of a search
warrant if the defendant can establish that
(i) an affiant in an affidavit supporting a
search warrant made a false statement
intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless
disregard for the truth, and (ii) the
affidavit is insufficient to support a
finding of probable cause after the
misstatement is set aside. 483 U.S. 171-72.
•

• •

Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. The Court went on to hold that the
misstatement "is not to be a factor in the decision to suppress
unless the misconduct materially affects the finding of probable
cause."

Id.

See also Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130-132. The

misstatements alleged by defendant fail to meet this standard,
first, because the statements were not false; second, even if they
were false they were not made intentionally, knowingly, or with
reckless disregard for the truth; and finally, the misstatements
were not material and their omission would not have affected the
finding of probable cause.

The first alleged misstatement is in paragraph four of
the affidavit, where the affiant states that the confidential
informant "told your affiant of what he believed to be a
clandestine-type lab producing illegal substances located at the
residence in Perry."

Defendant claims this is a misstatement

based upon his assertion that the informant never used the words
"clandestine-type lab."

This, again, is the type of "excessive

technical dissection of an informant's tip or of the nontechnical
language in the officer's affidavit" which the Supreme Court
disapproved in Hansen.

Hansen at 130.

It seems obvious that even

if the informant never used the "magic" words, he did convey to
the police the idea that there was a secret lab at defendant's
home which he suspected was being used to produce illegal
substances.

The statement is not false.

Regardless of the

informant's characterization of the lab, his information about the
presence of lab equipment and chemicals that a state criminalist
found to be consistent with the production of controlled
substances would have supported issuance of the search warrant.
The second alleged misstatement deals with the
statement in the affidavit that the chemicals observed at
defendant's residence could be used to produce phenyl-2-propanone.
This is substantially the same argument as defendant makes in
Point IV of his brief, that phenyl-2-propanone is not specifically
mentioned in the Utah Controlled Substance Act and that it is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to allow the
federal government to schedule controlled substances.

The

constitutional aspects of this issue will be argued in Point IV of

this brief.

This inquiry is not relevant to defendant's claim

that the affidavit contains a misstatement as the issuing
magistrate would have been guided by the unambiguous language of
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-3(2) which reads: "All controlled
substances listed in the Federal Controlled Substances Act (Title
II, P.L. 91-513), as it is amended from time to time, are hereby
controlled."

At the time of the issuance of the search warrant,

phenyl-2-propanone was listed in the Federal Controlled Substances
Act as a controlled substance.

The magistrate was justified in

issuing the search warrant on this authority.

Should the Court

decide that this is a misstatement, it is not material.

The

affidavit stated that the chemicals and equipment at defendant's
residence were consistent with the production of phenyl-2propanone and methamphetamine.

Methamphetairdne is specifically

listed in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(B) as a schedule II
controlled substance.

Were phenyl-2-propanone to be excised from

the affidavit, the issuing magistrate would still have been
justified in issuing the search warrant to search for
methamphetamine.
Defendant next claims that there was a material
omission from the affidavit which should be read back into the
affidavit.

The material omission asserted by defendant is the

fact that the previous owner of defendant's home was a high school
chemistry teacher, and that this would explain the presence of
chemicals and equipment in defendant's home.

The foundation of

this argument rests on the porous claim that the chemistry teacher
stored "substantial" chemicals and equipment in his home, and that

when he moved he left behind substantial amounts of personal
property.

These assumptions are unfounded; the more natural

assumption would be that when the former owner moved, he took all
of his personal belongings.

This is in fact what happened; when

the former owner moved, he left the house and garage empty (T.
329).

It had been fifteen years since he had taught high school

chemistry and had never had a chemistry lab in his home (T. 329).
The fact that the former owner of the house was a chemistry
teacher was not a material omission from the affidavit and the
Court need not read this information into the affidavit.
Defendant's final contention is that the information
relied on in the affidavit was stale.
case law to support this point.

He relies solely on federal

Utah case law would clearly

uphold the issuance of the search warrant in the instant case.

In

State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983), the Court upheld the
issuance of a search warrant which relied on an affidavit which
specified no dates when an informant observed marijuana on
defendant's premises.

In that case the Court found that the

affidavit "which describes on-going criminal activity, clearly
refutes any contention that it was based upon stale information."
Id. at 1261.
In Hansen the Court upheld the issuance of a search
warrant where a period of time had lapsed between observance of
the contraband and issuance of a search warrant.

The Court held

that w[a] mere passage of time does not necessarily invalidate the
supporting basis for the warrant."
131.

State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d at

The Court cited Anderton and found that "a common-sense

reading of that affidavit suggested the continuing nature of the
drug's presence.-

Id.

These cases make it clear that a magistrate may issue a
search warrant if a period of time has lapsed between observance
of the contraband and issuance of the search warrant if the
affidavit suggests that the nature of the criminal activity is ongoing.

In the instant case, the issuing magistrate was presented

with an affidavit which alleged that a clandestine drug laboratory
was producing illegal substances.

Drug manufacturing is a classic

example of an on-going criminal activity.

The amount of chemicals

observed and the nature of the lab equipment suggested that the
operation would still be operating at the time of the issuance of
the warrant.
Other jurisdictions have considered this situation and,
likewise, have found that a search warrant may be issued if the
nature of the crime is on-going.

See State v. King, 752 P.2d 869,

870 (Or. App. 1988) ("The facts asserted in the affidavit
indicated that there was a large scale, on-going drug operation
from which a magistrate, after considering all of the relevant
factors contained within the affidavit, could reasonably infer
that the contraband was still on the premises.");

U.S. v. Dozier,

844 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988); State v. Garcia, 566 P.2d 426 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1977); State v. Torrez, 544 P.2d 207 (Ariz. 1975); State
v, Austria, 524 P.2d 290 (Haw. 1974).

POINT II
THE INFORMANT WAS NOT ACTING AS AN AGENT FOR
THE STATE, AND HIS CONDUCT DOES NOT TRIGGER
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE.
Defendant claims that the evidence seized during the
search of his residence should be suppressed because the
confidential informant, Andy Pommier, entered his premises
illegally.

His theory has three theoretical bases:

first, he

claims that the entry was illegal because Mr. Pommier was a
government employee or agent when he entered defendant's garage
and was constitutionally constrained from entering the premises;
second, he argues that if Mr. Pommier was not a government
employee or agent, he was "acting" as a government agent when he
entered the garage, and was therefore constitutionally constrained
in his actions; and, finally, he makes the unsupported argument
that the illegality of Mr. Pommier's entry into the garage by
itself should bar use of the evidence.
The primary question is whether at the time of Mr.
Pommier's entries into defendant's garage, he was acting as a
private citizen.

If he were acting as a private citizen,

defendant's argument must fail.

The Supreme Court's decision in

State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), controls disposition of
this issue.

In Watts the Court stated:

The fourth amendment guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures protects
only against governmental actions and does
not extend to the independent acts of private
citizens. Thus, as was observed in Walter v.
United States, [447 U.S. 649, 100 S.Ct. 2395,
65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980),] the exclusionary rule
has no application to evidence obtained from
private citizens acting on their own
initiative: "[A] wrongful search or seizure

conducted by a private party does not violate
the Fourth Amendment and . . . such private
wrongdoing does not deprive the government of
the right to use evidence that it has
acquired lawfully." Likewise, this Court in
State v. Newbold# [581 P.2d 991 (Utah 1972)
(plurality opinion)] held, "The protection of
the Fourth Amendment is a restraint only upon
the activities of sovereign authority and is
not applicable to the searches and seizures
by any persons other than government officers
and agents. ••

unreasonable private searches are not subject
to the protection of article I, section 14 of
the Utah Constitution.
Id. at 1220-21 (footnotes omitted).
Defendant's first claim, that Mr. Pommier was a
government employee or agent when he first entered defendant's
garage, is without support either in the record or in the law.
Defendant's argument seems to be that Mr. Pommier, acting in his
capacity as an assistant fire marshall, entered the garage to make
an inspection.

Mr. Pommier was a member of the volunteer fire

department and sometimes acted as assistant fire marshall (P.T.
96).

As a volunteer fireman, he had no duties to inspect homes.

He testified that he acted as assistant fire marshall only when
the fire marshall was out of town (T. 96). As assistant fire
marshall, he understood his duties to be the inspection of
businesses and, on request, the inspection of fireplaces at
residences, though there are no specific written duties of
assistant fire marshall (T. 134). He testified that when he
searched defendant's garage, he was not searching for hazards (T.
135), nor was he acting as an agent of the fire department (T.
93).

Despite defendant's insistent contention to the contrary,

Mr. Pommier entered defendant's garage merely out of curiosity
(P.T. 93# 106, 107# 113, 135; T. 346, 354, 355).
Defendant makes the unsupported claim that Mr. Pommier
could have been considered a special function officer under Utah
Code Ann. S 77-la-4, as a fire arson investigator.

This argument

fails because defendant has failed to show that Mr. Pommier is a
fire arson investigator.

It seems highly unlikely that a member

of a volunteer fire department would be automatically qualified to
be a fire arson investigator.

Assuming, arguendo, that Mr.

Pommier is a fire arson investigator, he is not necessarily a
peace officer as subsection (3)(a) requires that a "special
function officer may not exercise the authority of a peace officer
until the officer has satisfactorily completed an approved basic
training program for special function officers."

It has not been

demonstrated that Mr. Pommier is a fire arson investigator, nor
that he has ever completed the basic training program for special
function officers.

For these reasons, Mr. Pommier could not be

considered a government agent when he entered defendant's garage.
Defendant next claims that Mr. Pommier was acting as an
agent of the government when he entered defendant's garage.

In

Watts, the Court found that there are two areas of inquiry which
bear upon the determination of whether a person is acting
privately or as a government agent when he/she conducts a search:
(1) the government's knowledge of or acquiescence in the intrusive
conduct, and (2) the intent and purpose of the person conducting
the search.

In Watts, an informant was told by the police that if

he provided them with information leading to a prosecutable case,

a criminal case against him might be dismissed.

The informant

told the police that there was a shed in back of the defendant's
house where he was growing and curing marijuana plants.

The

police, acting on the tip, obtained a search warrant and found the
contraband in the shed.

The court upheld the admission of the

evidence since the informant was acting as a private citizen when
he illegally entered the defendant's shed.

The court concluded

that the informant's "specific actions were for the most part his
own and were not substantially motivated by the prompting and
encouragement of the Provo Police Department."

jUi. at 1223.

The instant case is even more compelling.

Mr. Pommier

had no prior contact with the police at the time he entered
defendant's garage.

He had no expectation of reward.

It seems

obvious that Mr. Pommier's actions were not "for the most part"
his own, but were totally his own.

This Court should find that

Mr. Pommier was acting as a private citizen when he entered
defendant's garage as the government had no knowledge of or
acquiescence in the intrusive conduct, and Mr. Pommier's intent in
entering the garage was the satisfaction of curiosity with no
expectation of reward.
Defendant's final point is redundant.

Claiming that

the prosecution's use of illegally obtained evidence violates due
process is just another way of saying Mr. Pommier was an agent of
the police when he entered defendant's garage.

State v. Louden,

387 P.2d 240 (Utah 1963), which defendant cites, is inapposite.
Further, it was vacated by the United States Supreme Court at 379
U.S. 1.

Louden dealt with an illegal search by a police officer,

not a private citizen.

POINT III
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS AS THE
EVIDENCE DESTROYED BY THE STATE WAS NOT
MATERIAL TO HIS GUILT OR INNOCENCE.
Defendant claims that his due process rights were
violated when the State, after taking samples of chemicals found
on defendant's premises that were consistent with the production
of controlled substances, destroyed other chemicals located on his
premises which were hazardous.

Defendant's argument on this point

is confusing, but seems to be that the chemicals that were
destroyed would have been material in supporting his theory that
the chemicals could have been used in manufacturing substances
other than controlled substances.
In State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101, 106 (Utah 1985), the
Supreme Court established the standard to judge whether
destruction of evidence constitutes a denial of due process:
In State v. Stewart, Utah, 544 P.2d 477
(1975), we said, "[A] deliberate suppression
or destruction of evidence by those charged
with the prosecution, including police
officers, constitutes a denial of due process
if the evidence is material to guilt or
innocence of the defendant in a criminal case
. . . ." Id. at 479 (emphasis added). We
clarified this proposition in State v.
Nebeker, Utah, 657 P.2d 1359 (1983), where we
said, "The materiality required to reverse a
criminal conviction for suppression or
destruction of evidence as a denial of due
process is more than evidentiary
materiality.,f Ijci. at 1363. Rather, it must
be "material in the constitutional sense."
Id. (emphasis added). Constitutional
materiality requires that there be a showing
that the suppressed or destroyed evidence is
vital to the issues of whether the defendant
is guilty of the charge and whether there is
fundamental unfairness that requires the
Court to set aside the defendant's
conviction. Ici. A corollary of this

proposition is, "The mere possibility that an
item of undisclosed information might have
helped the defense, or might have affected
the outcome of the trial, does not establish
'materiality' in the constitutional sense,"
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10,
96 S.Ct. 2392, 2400-2401, 49 L.Ed.2d 342
(1976) (emphasis added); accord Nebeker, 657
P.2d at 1363.
The gravamen of this issue is whether the chemicals destroyed by
the State could be considered evidence which is material in the
constitutional sense.

The question is whether the destroyed

chemicals are material to the innocence of the defendant.

The

destroyed evidence was simply not constitutionally material to
defendant's defense.
Defendant's argument on this point is based on a
misunderstanding of the State's position at trial.

Defendant

repeatedly asserts that the State's theory of the case was based
on its contention that the sole function and use of the chemicals
found on defendant's premises was to produce a controlled
substance.

This is incorrect.

The State's position was that the

combination and amount of chemicals found on defendant's premises,
along with the type of lab equipment in use, were consistent with
the production of a controlled substance.

The State's witness,

D.E.A. Chemist Chuck Hall, admitted that there are any number of
uses for many of the chemicals found on defendant's premises.
State does not discount that defendant could have produced
fertilizers and sprays at his house, nor that many of the
chemicals could be used in any number of chemical processes.
There is no dispute that of eighty to one hundred chemicals
seized, only about thirteen samples of the substances were

The

preserved for analysis (P.T. 14-15).

However, before destruction

of the chemicals which were deemed hazardous and non-storable, an
inventory was taken (P.T. 16). Through this inventory, and his
own testimony, defendant could essentially establish what
chemicals he possessed, and attempt to establish his defense.

It

was not necessary that he have samples of the destroyed chemicals
available for independent analysis to establish his defense that
his possession of the chemicals was legitimate.
The evidence was conclusive that the chemicals, in the
amount found, were being used to produce phenyl-2-propanone.
phenyl-2-propanone was found in defendant's garage laboratory (T.
232-235).

Mr. Hall testified that there is no legitimate legal

use for phenyl-2-propanone, except perhaps in the production of
cat food (T. 223). Defendant never claimed to be making cat food,
nor did he testify to what legitimate use he was putting phenyl-2propanone.

Mr. Hall also testified that phenyl-2-propanone is not

a by-product of any other chemical processes (T. 115). The police
found 750 pounds of phenylacetic acid in defendant's garage
laboratory (T. 219). Phenylacetic acid is a precursor to the
production of phenyl-2-propanone (T. 113). Mr. Hall testified
that the only other known use for phenylacetic acid is in the
production of perfume (T. 172). He testified that he was aware of
no other chemical synthesis for this acid (T. 172). Defendant did
not argue at trial, nor does he argue now, that he was producing
perfume.

In fact, defendant does not specifically name any

innocent uses for the phenylacetic acid.

In his testimony,

defendant claims that he produced fertilizers and plant sprays at

his home (T. 495). He never testified at trial how he used the
phenylacetic acid, nor does he propose any alternate uses on
appeal.
Defendant's vague assertions of materiality do not rise
to a constitutional level.

If defendant were to propose an

alternate explanation for the presence of th€* chemicals, which he
does not, the presence of the destroyed chemicals would merely
"have corroborated the defendant's story, it would not have been
exculpatory."

State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1305 (Utah 1986).

Defendant has failed to show that the evidence destroyed was vital
to the issue of whether defendant was guilty of the charge. He,
therefore, is not entitled to reversal of the conviction.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION IS NOT INVALID AS A
RESULT OF THE UTAH LEGISLATURE'S
INCORPORATION OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
ENUMERATED IN THE FEDERAL CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES ACT.
Defendant claims that Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-3 (1986)
2
and S 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988) , which incorporate substances
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-3 (1986) states:
(1) All controlled substances listed in
S 58-37-4 are hereby controlled.
(2) All controlled substances listed in
the Federal Controlled Substances Act (Title
II, P.L. 91-513), as it is amended from time
to time, are hereby controlled.
(3) Whenever any substance is designated,
rescheduled, or deleted as a controlled
substance in schedules I, II, III, IV, of V
of the Federal Controlled Substances Act
(Title II, P.L. 91-513), as such schedules
may be revised by Congresional enactment or
by administrative rule of the United States

contained in schedules I through V of the Federal Controlled
Substances Act into the Utah statutory scheme, results in an
unconstitutional delegation of authority by the Utah legislature.
He also claims that the inclusion of the federally-defined
controlled substances does not give adequate notice of what
conduct is prohibited by Utah statute.
"It is a well-established rule that legislative
enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity and
will not be declared unconstitutional unless there is no
reasonable basis upon which they can be construed as conforming
to constitutional requirements."

In re Criminal Investigation,

7th Dist. Court No. CS-lf 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988), citing
Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 806-07 (Utah 1974).

See also

State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987); Murray City v. Hall,

Cont. Attorney General adopted pursuant to
S 201 of that act, that subsequent
designation, rescheduling or deletion shall
govern.
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988) states:
(4) "Controlled substance" means a drug,
substance, or immediate precursor included in
scheduels I, II, III, IV or V of Section 5837-4, and also includes a drug, substance, or
immediate precursor included in schedules I,
II, III, IV or V of the Federal Controlled
Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513, as
those schedules may be revised to add,
delete, or transfer substances from one
schedule to another, whether by Congressional
enactment or by administrative rule of the
United States Attorney General adopted under
Section 201 of that act. Controlled
substance does not include distilled spirits,
wine, or malt beverages, as those terms are
defined or used in Title 32A, regarding
tobacco or food.

663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983).

The appellate court must look to the

••reasonable or actual legislative purpose" in evaluating
constitutional challenges.

Id.

The burden is on the challenging

party to establish the unconstitutionality of the statute.
Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984).
doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality.

Rio
All

Ellis v.

Social Service Dept. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980).
In the present case, defendant relies on State v.
Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977), as the basis for his argument
that Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-3 (1986) and S 58-37-2(4) (Supp.
1988) unconstitutionally delegate the authority of the Utah
legislature.

However, as more fully set-forth below, Gallion was

decided under a statute that has since been revised, and the
delegation of authority under the present statutory scheme
applied in this case is not barred by article V, section I of the
Utah Constitution.

Because Gallion does not control the outcome

of this case, and defendant has not demonstrated that Utah Code
Ann. S 58-37-3 and 58-37-2(4) are unconstitutional, this Court
should find there is a reasonable basis for construing the
statutes to conform to constitutional requirements.
The Utah legislature has enacted a detailed statutory
scheme in an effort to manage the dissemination of controlled
substances and criminalize conduct in violation of the law.

Utah

Code Ann. S 58-37-4 (1986) contains schedules I through V in
which controlled substances are specifically enumerated.

Section

58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(A) and (B) specifically name amphetamine, its

salts optical isomers, and salts of its optical isomers, and
methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers, as
being controlled.

Phenyl-2-propanone is an immediate precursor

to amphetamine and methamphetamine (T. 113, 118). Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-3 (1986) and S 58-37-2(4) unequivocably state that in
addition to the controlled substances specifically enumerated in
S 58-37-4, additional substances enumerated in the schedules of
the Federal Controlled Substances Act are also controlled in
Utah.

In other words, the legislature has legislated by

reference to the federal schedules to name additional controlled
substances.
Given the nature of the problems related to the
management of controlled substances, it would be impracticable to
impose an absolute bar on the legislature's authority to delegate
certain fact finding processes in which a determination is made
that substance should be controlled.

The United States Congress

has delegated to the United States Attorney General, the head of
the Drug Enforcement Agency, the authority to classify substances
as controlled.

The DEA has the expertise to evaluate new

substances and determine whether they should be controlled.

The

delegation of this authority has survived constitutional
challenge.

See United States v. Emerson, 846 F.2d 541 (9th Cir.

1988); United States v. Hope, 714 F.2d 1084 (11th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Alexander, 673 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1982).
Gallion was decided twelve years ago, and did not
recognize or address the explosion of development in the drug
industry.

A number of state courts which have addressed the

issue and upheld the delegation of authority by the legislature
in similar circumstances have recognized the need for such
delegation.

In State v. Kellogg, 98 Idaho 541, 568 P.2d 514, 517

(1977), the court stated:
The state of the drug art is constantly
undergoing change, revision and development.
Thousands of potentially dangerous drugs
exist, and it would be impossible for the
legislature to consider each drug and
evaluate the need for prescription status.
Delegation of the drug-by-drug evaluation is
a necessary and proper exercise of
legislative authority.
In Montoya v. 0'Tooele, 94 N.M. 303, 610 P.2d 190, 192 (1980),
the court recognized the "enormous burden" that would be placed
on the legislature if it were required to consider each of the
thousands of new drugs manufactured by pharmaceutical companies
each year.

The legislature would still need to rely upon experts

in the area for assistance in making determinations of which
substances should be controlled.

The determinations must be

reviewed continuously, and the lack of attention by the
legislature due to time constraints and the limited opportunity
to act could result in dangerous drugs being disseminated prior
to legislative enactments.

Id.

The Utah legislature convenes only once a year,
excluding special sessions.

It has a huge number of bills to

consider and only a limited amount of time.

For months on end,

when the legislature is out of session, new drugs are continually
being developed, which would not be subject to control at all
until the next session.

Given the high technology and rapid

development in both the legitimate and illicit drug industries,

it is particularly important that alternatives for fact finding
be allowed.

As in the case of phenyl-2-propanone, other new

drugs are continually being developed and must be subject to
timely control.

The legislature must be allowed to delegate, at

least in part, the fact finding process.
In State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977), the Utah
Supreme Court held that the legislature had provided an
unconstitutional delegation of power when it allowed the Utah
Attorney General to decide that Demerol should be regulated as a
controlled substance.

The legislature had not specifically

included Demerol on the schedules of controlled substances.
Code Ann. S 58-37-2(2) (1974)

provided:

Utah

M

The attorney general

of the state of Utah shall administer the provisions of this act
and may add or delete substances or reschedule all substances
enumerated in the schedule in section 58-37-4."
added.)

(Emphasis

The Court found this section to be in contravention of

article V, section I of the Utah Constitution, which provides:
The powers of the government of the State
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct
departments, the Legislative, the Executive,
and the Judicial; and no person charged with
the exercise of powers properly belonging to
one of these departments, shall exercise any
functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted.
(Emphasis added.)

The Court noted that the Utah attorney general

is a member of the executive department and had an obvious
potential conflict.

The attorney general should be aware of

The statutory scheme has been substantially revised and no
longer contains this provision.

possible constitutional problems in statutes and could be placed
in the "anomalous position of exercising a potential challenge to
a law he has, in fact, amended,"

K**

at

686.

Following Gallionf

Utah'8 controlled substances statutory scheme was revised.

The

Utah attorney general no long has statutory authority to
designate what substances are to be controlled.

As a result,

under the revised statutes (now S 58-37-3 (1986) and S 58-372(4)), article V, section I of the Utah Constitution is not
offended, as "no person" within the Utah executive department has
been charged with a function of the legislative department.
Defendant also contends that Gallion precludes the
legislature from delegating its power to define crimes and enact
penalties.

The inclusion by reference of the federal controlled

substances schedules, which are substantially similar in design
4
to the Utah counterparts, do not constitute an improper
delegation of power to enact criminal statutes.

The Utah

legislature has determined that it is illegal to possess,
manufacture, distribute, etc., controlled substances, absent
express authority.

The contested provisions simply allow

adoption by reference to specifically enumerated substances that
are determined controlled by the federal government.

The Uniform Controlled Substances Act has been adopted, with
minor variations by at least forty-five states. The act closely
follows the federal controlled substance laws. The purpose of
the act is to establish a rational approach to regulating
potentially dangerous substances, which are uniform with other
states and the federal counterparts. The act established five
schedules, which delineate drugs according to their medical value
and potential for abuse. State v. Peloquin, 427 A.2d 1327, 1328,
1328 n. 3 (R.I. 1981).

Defendant also contends that the incorporation of the
federal controlled substances schedules does not provide him with
adequate notice of what acts constitute criminal conduct in Utah.
Defendant's argument is without merit.

Utah statutes,

specifically Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-3 (1986) and 58-37-2(4)
(Supp. 1988), specifically and unequivocably state that the term
-controlled substance11 includes all drugs and their immediate
precursors listed in schedules I through V of Utah Code Ann. S
58-37-4 and all substances and their immediate precursors listed
in schedules I through V of the Federal Controlled Substances
Act.

The Federal Act specifically designates the United States

Attorney General, as head of the Drug Enforcement Agency, to name
controlled substances and sets forth detailed, specific
procedures that must be followed.

21 U.S.C. S 811 (1988).

The

result in published in schedules I through V of the Federal
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. S 812) and in the Code of
Federal Regulations.
Although it may be slightly more complex to determine
what substances are controlled in Utah by also examining federal
law, it is nevertheless clear and specifically defined.

Further,

a person who is concerned about the legality of possession of a
substance at all, would necessarily be concerned about what would
constitute a violation of, not only Utah law, but federal law as
well.

Therefore, one must, in any event, examine the federal

schedules in order to be informed.
Even absent the specific proclamation under the Federal
Controlled Substances Act that phenyl-2-propanone is controlled,

defendant should have been on notice that possession or
manufacture of the drug was illegal based solely upon the
provisions of the Utah Code.

Phenyl-2-propanone is an immediate

precursor to amphetamine and methamphetamine, both of which are
specifically enumerated as controlled substances in Utah.

Utah

Code Ann. S 58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(A) and (B). The possession of an
immediate precursor of a specifically enumerated controlled
substance is unlawful.

Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988).

The Utah legislature did not unconstitutionally
delegate its authority by enacting Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-3
(1986) and S 58-37-2(4), which include in the Utah statutory
definition of a controlled substance additional substances that
are enumerated in the Federal Controlled Substances Act.

These

statutes do not violate the non-delegation doctrine contained in
article I, section V of the Utah Constitution, and defendant was
given adequate notice that his conduct was unlawful in Utah.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1 WAS NOT ERROR.
Defendant claims that he was denied the opportunity to
challenge the administrative procedure and findings of the United
States Attorney General with regard to the inclusion of phenyl-2propanone as a controlled substance under the federal act.
Defendant implies that the trial court should have given his
proposed instruction No. 1 so that he could have made this
challenge.

Defendant does not claim that the trial court's

refusal to give his proposed instruction constitutes reversible
error or entitles him to a new trial.
at 43-44.)

(Defendant's opening brief

Defendant certainly had the opportunity to challenge
the procedures utilized in determining that phenyl-2-propanone is
a controlled substance.

In fact, he did move to dismiss the

charges against him because phenyl-2-propanone is not enumerated
on the controlled substances schedules in the Utah Code (T. 3045).

He could have also taken the opportunity to challenge the

procedures used by the United States Attorney General to
determine that phenyl-2-propanone is controlled, if there were
merit to this claim, but chose not to.

Instead, he submitted

proposed Instruction No. 1 (Appendix A ) . Defendant did not raise
the issue during the course of the trial, and the record does not
support a finding that there was anything incorrect about the
procedures used by the United States Attorney General in
determining that phenyl-2-propanone is a controlled substance.
Under these circumstances, this Court should assume the
correctness of the trial court's judgment and affirm defendant's
conviction.

State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986); State v.

Olmos, 712 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986); State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681
(Utah 1985).
Defendant cites only to State v. Gallion# 572 P.2d 683
(Utah 1977), and does not demonstrate where the trial court's
error lies.

The purpose of jury instructions is to set forth

issues and the applicable law in clear and concise terms, so the
that jury will understand how it should discharge its duties.
State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980).

If defendant wanted

to raise as a defense a claim that the procedures were not
followed, it was incumbent on him to present some evidence in

this regard.

Absent a reasonable basis in the record as to a

defense, the trial court is not required to instruct on the
issue.

See State v. Hardingy 635 P.2d 33 (Utah 1981).
The State has the burden of proving all elements of the

offense, and it did so.

The trial court instructed the jury on

the applicable burden of proof (Instruction No. 8, appendix B)
and presumption of innocence (Instruction No. 6, appendix C).
Defendant does not contend that if his instruction had been
given, the outcome of the trial would have been different.
Absent this showing, the conviction must be affirmed.

State v.

Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987).
CONCLUSION
Defendant, Michael Lewis Green, aka James Alvin
Douglas, was properly convicted of manufacturing a controlled
substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute.

For the foregoing reasons, as well as any additional

arguments made at the time of oral argument, the State of Utah
requests this Court to affirm defendant's convictions.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

day of October, 1989.

R. PAUL VAN DAMN
Utah Attorney General

fBARA BEJARNSCW

f s i s t a n t Attorney General
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INSTRUCTION NO.
You are instructed t h a t under the laws of the State of Utah
Phenyl-2-Pnopanone, or P-2-P, is not a controlled s u b s t a n c e .

How-

e v e r , if a substance has been lawfully made a controlled substance
under the Federal Controlled Substances Act, then i t is controlled
under the Utah Controlled Substances Act.
Therefore, if the Scate proves beyond a reasonable doubt:
A: 1.

B:

Thac the Jnited States Attorney General by r u l e
scheduled the substance P-2-P or Phenyl-2-Propanone as a controlled s u b s t a n c e ;

2.

That the United States Attorney General made a
finding, after a h e a r i n g in accordance with his
rulemaking procedures, which a t l e a s t allowed for
a h e a r i n g on the record, t h a t P-2-P has a potential
for abuse;

3.

That the United States Attorney General found t h a t
t h e substance P-2-P:
a. Has a potential for abuse less t h a n the drugs
on schedules I and I I ;
b . Has a c u r r e n t l y accepted medical use in t r e a t ment in the United States; and
c . Abuse of the substance may lead to moderate
or low p h y s i c a l dependence or high psychological
dependence; and

4.

That notice of s a i d action was properly published in
in the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations.; or

That the United States Attorney General properly found,
p u r s u a n t to a h e a r i n g and i n accordance with his r u l e making a u t h o r i t y , t h a t P-2-P was an immediate precurser
in t h a t :
a . t h e Attorney General has found i t to be and by
r e g u l a t i o n designated as being the principal compound
used, or produced p r i m a r i l y for use, in the manufacture of a controlled s u b s t a n c e ;
b . I t is an immediate chemical intermediary used or
likely to be used in the manufacture of a c o n t r o l l e d
s u b s t a n c e ; and
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c. The control of which is is necessary to prevent
curtail, or limit the manufacture of such controlled
substance.
then you may determine that the substance P-2-P or Phenyl-2-Propanone is a controlled substance under Utah Law.
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APPENDIX B

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

The burden rests upon the prosecution to establish every
element of the crime with which the Defendant is charged, and
every element of the crime must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt.

If any one or more elements of the crime is

not proved beyond a reasonable doubt then the defendant is
entitled to be found not guilty.
The Defendant has no burden to either produce evidence
or establish any fact.
Defendant.
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No burden is ever to be shifted to the

APPENDIX C

INSTRUCTION NO.

p

A person charged with a crime is presumed to be innocent
until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The

presumption of innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded
by the jury at pleasure, but is a sustantial, essential part of
the law and is binding upon the jury.

This presumption is a

humane provision of the law, intended, so far as human agency
is capable, to guard against the danger of an innocent person
being unjustly punished.

This presumption attends the

defendant through every stage in the trial, and, if possible,
you should reconcile the evidence with this presumption, and in
case of a reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is
satisfactorily shown, you should acquit the defendant.
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